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 Positive Prognosis for Judges: 
A Look into Judge-Directed 




A mother rushes her six-year-old daughter to North Central Bronx 
Hospital.1  The little girl has a fever and a rash all over her body.2  At the 
hospital, an emergency room nurse examines the little girl.3  The nurse 
assures the mother that the little girl probably just has a virus and sends the 
mother and daughter home.4  The following day, the little girl displays the 
same symptoms.5  The mother rushes her to the hospital, but this time her 
mother brings her to a private hospital.6  The doctors at the private hospital 
examine the little girl and diagnose her with more than just a virus—a 
bacterial blood infection.7  In order to save her life, the doctors have to 
amputate her leg, the toes on the other leg’s foot, and the fingers on one of 
her hands.8  Several months later, the little girl’s family notifies North 
Central Bronx Hospital that it will be suing for medical malpractice for the 
 
* Kristine Gamboa received her Juris Doctor from Pepperdine University Law School and 
Certificate in Dispute Resolution from the Straus Institute for Dispute Resolution in 2013.  She 
would like to thank the Honorable  Douglas McKeon,  the staff at Pepperdine Dispute Resolution 
Law Journal, and her family for their help and support.   
 1. Gale Scott, Med Mal Cases Get Expert Hearings, CRAIN’S NEW YORK BUSINESS, Aug. 22, 
2010,  http://www.crainsnewyork.com/article/20100822/SUB/308229981. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
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hospital’s misdiagnosis.9  Even though the misdiagnosis was clearly North 
Central Bronx Hospital’s fault10 and the family most likely would get a 
verdict in its favor, the family would be in for a long journey of medical 
malpractice litigation.11 
Medical malpractice litigation has been characterized as burdensome, 
expensive, and slow.12  A patient must be willing to be interrogated by 
attorneys, submit to a deposition, go to trial if the case does not settle, pay 
attorney’s fees, and wait years for compensation.13  However, the primary 
issue concerning medical malpractice litigation has been its exorbitant cost.14  
Reports show that health care providers incur costs amounting to tens of 
billions of dollars each year due to medical malpractice liability.15 
Because of these overwhelming statistics, studies have been conducted 
in an effort to reduce medical malpractice liability.16  These studies looked at 
the needs of injured patients and the reasons why they file medical 
malpractice claims against their health care providers.17  In the 1990s, all 
levels of the health care system made concerted efforts to address patient 
and health care provider concerns.18  Moreover, the health care system 
looked into alternative forms of dispute resolution as a way to reduce 
 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. (quoting the then-Bronx Superior Court Judge Douglas McKeon who became involved 
in the mishap when the family notified the city several months later that it was suing for medical 
malpractice: “The misdiagnosis was clearly the city-run hospital’s fault.”). 
 11. Id. 
 12. David A. Hyman & Charles Silver, Medical Malpractice Litigation and Tort Reform: It’s 
the Incentives, Stupid, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1085, 1114 (2006). 
 13. Id. at 1114–15.  Other problems a plaintiff may face include being “blacklisted” by other 
physicians or providers who refuse to treat patients who are known to sue and have terminated their 
existing relationships with a health care provider in order to bring suit.  Id. at 1114; see, e.g., 
Christine Wiebe, Physicians Take the Offensive Against Malpractice Suits, MEDSCAPE MONEY & 
MED., Apr. 30, 2004, available at http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/474639 (reporting that 
doctors in Texas are blacklisting malpractice claimants and that doctors are requiring patients to 
pledge that they will not assert claims). 
 14. Mark A. Rothstein, Health Care Reform and Medical Malpractice Claims, 38 J.L. MED. & 
ETHICS 871, 871 (2010) (citing Edward P. Richards & Thomas R. McLean, Administrative 
Compensation for Medical Malpractice Injuries: Reconciling the Brave New World of Patient Safety 
and the Torts System, 49 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 73, 74 (2004)). 
 15. Thomas L. Hafemeister & Joshua Hinckley Porter, The Health Care Reform Act of 2010 
and Medical Malpractice Liability: Worlds in Collision or Ships Passing in the Night?, 64 SMU L. 
REV. 735, 739 (2011). 
 16. Id. at 740 (citing Rothstein, supra note 14, at 872). 
 17. Id. at 740 (citing Rothstein, supra note 14, at 872). 
 18. Id. at 740 (citing Paul J. Barringer et al., Administrative Compensation of Medical 
Injuries: A Hardy Perennial Blooms Again, 33 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 725, 740–42 (2008)). 
2
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medical malpractice claims.19  Nonetheless, in the early 2000s, the cost of 
physicians’ malpractice insurance premiums still increased significantly.20 
This increase started a debate regarding who was at fault for the 
significant costs of medical malpractice liability.21  One side blamed the 
costs on the “litigiousness of patients” and the amount of jury awards.22  
Because of these arguments, some providers advocated for tort reform to 
limit medical malpractice lawsuits.23  This reform was seen as a way to 
ultimately reduce malpractice premiums for health care providers.24  
However, it would require changing existing laws.25  The other side blamed 
health care providers for utilizing “defensive medicine” out of fear of 
potential liability.26  This side argued that “defensive medicine” ultimately 
led to increased costs.27 
 
 19. Id. at 740 (citing Barringer et al., supra note 18, at 740–42). 
 20. Id. at 740 (citing J. Robert Hunter, Gillian Cassell-Stiga & Joanne Doroshow, True Risk: 
Medical Liability, Malpractice Insurance and Health Care 14 (2009), available at http://www.
centerjd.org/air/TrueRiskF.pdf (graph)). 
 21. Id. at 740–41. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 741. 
 24. Id. 
 25. See AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH AND QUALITY, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & 
HUMAN SERVS., MEDICAL LIABILITY REFORM AND PATIENT SAFETY INITIATIVE PROGRESS REPORT, 
available at http://www.ahrq.gov/qual/liability/medliabrep.htm (last updated Feb. 2012) [hereinafter 
MEDICAL LIABILITY REFORM AND PATIENT SAFETY INITIATIVE PROGRESS REPORT].  Some states 
have initiated malpractice reform to cap non-economic damages.  See MICHELLE M. MELLO & 
ALLEN KACHALIA, EVALUATION OF OPTIONS FOR MEDICAL MALPRACTICE SYSTEM REFORM 
(2010), available at http://www.medpac.gov/documents/Apr10_MedicalMalpractice_
CONTRACTOR.pdf.  For example, in 1975, California became the first state to cap non-economic 
damages to $250,000.  Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act of 1975 (MICRA) (codified at 
CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6146 (West 2006)). 
 26. Hafemeister & Porter, supra note 15.  “Defensive medicine” occurs “when doctors order 
tests, procedures, or visits, or avoid certain high-risk patients or procedures, primarily because of 
concern about malpractice liability.”  U.S. CONGRESS, OTA-H--602, OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, 
DEFENSIVE MEDICINE AND MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 1 (1994), available at http://biotech.law.lsu.
edu/policy/9405.pdf. 
 27. Hafemeister & Porter, supra note 15, at 741.  The debate also surrounded the insurance 
industry.  Tom Baker, Medical Malpractice and the Insurance Underwriting Cycle, 54 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 393, 394–95 (2005).  Trial lawyers and others argued that the high-priced phase of the liability 
insurance underwriting cycle fueled the medical malpractice insurance crisis in the early 2000s.  Id.  
In contrast, medical associations argued that the crisis represented the long overdue consequences of 
escalating tort costs that were allowed by the competitive phase of the insurance underwriting cycle.  
Id. 
3
Gamboa: Positive Prognosis for Judges: A Look into Judge-Directed Negotia
Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2013
 238 
Because of the debate, and perhaps because both sides of the debate 
have merits, President Obama addressed medical malpractice reform in his 
September 2009 address to Congress.28  In his address, President Obama 
directed the Secretary of Health and Human Services, Kathleen Sebelius, to 
allocate grants for various projects aimed at reforming medical malpractice 
liability.29 
One grant was made to the New York State Unified Court System to 
fund the implementation of a judge-directed negotiation program for early 
settlement in five academic medical centers in New York City and to expand 
the existing judge-directed negotiation program.30  A judge-directed 
negotiation is a process in which judges who have medical knowledge 
conduct and direct negotiations in a medical malpractice lawsuit rather than 
have the lawsuit go to trial.31  It focuses on early court intervention and 
facilitates discussion among attorneys about claims and potential 
settlements.32  Early court intervention takes the form of negotiations, which 
are like settlement conferences, but instead of being held years after a case is 
filed, they occur early on in the lawsuit, only months after a case is filed.33 
The case of the little girl who was misdiagnosed at North Central Bronx 
Hospital34 was part of the judge-directed negotiation experimental system in 
the Bronx.35  After five intense sessions with a judge, both sides agreed to 
settle the case for $6.8 million.36  Although this amount is significantly less 
 
 28. See Barack Obama, President of the U.S., Overhauling Health Care: Address to a Joint 
Session of Congress (Sept. 9, 2009), available at http:// www.presidentialrhetoric.com/
speeches/09.09.09.html [hereinafter the President’s Address to a Joint Sessions of Congress]. 
 29. Id. (recognizing the need to address medical malpractice liability reform: “I don’t believe 
malpractice reform is a silver bullet, but I’ve talked to enough doctors to know that defensive 
medicine may be contributing to unnecessary costs. . . .  So I’m proposing that we move forward on 
a range of ideas about how to put patient safety first and let doctors focus on practicing medicine. . . .  
I’m directing my Secretary of Health and Human Services to move forward on . . . [a demonstration 
projects] initiative today.”). 
 30. Hafemeister & Porter, supra note 15, at 741 (citing AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH 
AND QUALITY, GRANT SUMMARY FOR GRANT NUMBER HS19505-01, http://gold.ahrq.gov/
projectsearch/grant_summary.jsp?grant=R18+HS19505-01 (last visited Nov. 7, 2013)). 
 31. Just What the Doctor Ordered? Bringing Judges into Medical-Malpractice Negotiations, 
NEGOTIATION (Sept. 2011), available at http://www.pon.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/images/
posts/NEG0911_5.pdf [hereinafter Just What the Doctor Ordered?]. 
 32. Alice Gallegos, Medical Liability: Cutting Costs From the Bench, AM. MED. NEWS, Oct. 
31, 2011, available at http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2011/10/31/prsa1031.htm. 
 33. Health Care Appropriation Provides A Court-Based ADR Pilot Program, 29 
ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 108, 108 (2011). 
 34. See Scott, supra note 1. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
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than the little girl might have received from a jury trial, her lawyer was able 
to devise a settlement that guaranteed lifelong payments and included money 
for college.37  According to the little girl’s lawyer, this structured settlement 
could not have happened with a jury verdict.38  The little girl’s family and 
the hospital staff both left the judge-directed negotiation content with the 
settlement.39 
This article will look at judge-directed negotiations, and more 
specifically, whether this program can help improve medical malpractice 
litigation.  Part II will look at the existing judge-directed negotiation 
program in New York.  Part III will explore the program’s success.  Part IV 
will discuss praises for the program, whereas Part V will discuss the 
criticisms.  Finally, Part VI will conclude that judge-directed negotiations 
can improve medical malpractice litigation, and that other states should 
consider adopting a similar program. 
 
II. THE NEW YORK JUDGE-DIRECTED NEGOTIATION PROGRAM 
In 2002, the Honorable Douglas McKeon of the Bronx County Supreme 
Court developed the concept of judge-directed negotiations.40  Justice 
McKeon, who has been presiding for many years over thousands of civil 
claims in one of the busiest courts in the country,41 was trying to find a way 
to deal with a backlog of medical malpractice cases coming from the city’s 
Health and Hospitals Corporation (“HHC”). 42  One thing that bothered 
Justice McKeon about these cases was how they were treated in the system: 
they were classified as every other lawsuit, despite their complexity and the 
increased amount of time it took to review them.43  Therefore, Justice 
 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Gallegos, supra note 32.  Justice McKeon is also Chief Judge of Appellate Term, First 
Department.  New York Department of Health, New York State to Conduct Medical Liability 
Reform Demonstration with $3 Million Federal Grant, available at http://www.health.ny.gov/press/
releases/2010/2010-06-16_medical_liability_reform_demo_3_mill_fed_grant.htm (last updated June 
2010) [hereinafter New York State to Conduct Medical Liability Reform Demonstration].  Justice 
McKeon presides over all medical malpractice cases involving Health and Hospitals Corporation 
hospitals in the Bronx and Manhattan.  Id. 
 41. Gallegos, supra note 32. 
 42. Just What the Doctor Ordered?, supra note 31. 
 43. Gallegos, supra note 32. 
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McKeon decided to begin meeting with the attorneys representing the parties 
in medical malpractice cases.44  The meetings would take place in his 
chambers,45 where they would discuss the claims’ strengths and 
weaknesses.46 
Justice McKeon relied on his years of experience presiding over medical 
malpractice trials to guide him during these meetings.47  Additionally, he has 
acquired medical knowledge from auditing early morning anatomy classes at 
the Albert Einstein College of Medicine, and he has kept up to date on new 
medical techniques and technology by reading medical journals.48 
Furthermore, a nurse who has legal training assists Justice McKeon.49  
With all of these resources, Justice McKeon can advise each party on what 
they could reasonably expect from a jury trial and attempt to guide the 
parties toward an agreement.50 
Justice McKeon’s model expanded into a similar program in which a 
judge with expertise in medical matters becomes the “point person” once a 
plaintiff files a medical malpractice lawsuit.51  The judge directs the entire 
process by convening the parties to discuss the case and by helping broker a 
settlement.52  The judge conducts the negotiations, but does not impose a 
settlement amount.53  If the parties do not agree on a settlement, the plaintiff 
may move ahead with the lawsuit.54  In addition to using judge-directed 
negotiations based on Justice McKeon’s model, this program is aimed at 
improving patient safety and reducing malpractice costs.55 
 
 44. Just What the Doctor Ordered?, supra note 31. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Gallegos, supra note 32. 
 47. Just What the Doctor Ordered?, supra note 31. 
 48. Scott, supra note 1. 
 49. Just What the Doctor Ordered?, supra note 31.  Federal funding for the program funds the 
registered nurse with legal training.  Health Care Appropriation Provides a Court-Based ADR Pilot 
Program, supra note 33, at 108. 
 50. Just What the Doctor Ordered?, supra note 31. 
 51. MEDICAL LIABILITY REFORM AND PATIENT SAFETY INITIATIVE PROGRESS REPORT, supra 
note 25. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Just What the Doctor Ordered?, supra note 31.  More specifically, the program consists of 
four components: (1) each hospital will develop and promote a culture of patient safety; (2) four 
hospitals will initiate safety interventions in obstetrics and one hospital will initiate safety 
interventions in general surgery; (3) each hospital will implement a program whereby it will provide 
early disclosure to a patient and, if necessary, a patient’s family when a medical error occurs and, if 
appropriate, make an early (pre-litigation) offer of compensation; (4) a courtroom will be established 
to achieve early settlement through judge-directed negotiations for medical malpractice cases that do 
6
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This program is one of seven grants that were distributed by the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services.56  The New York judge-directed 
negotiation program started in Fall 2010 and was funded for three years with 
$3 million from the federal government.57  The grant money has allowed 
New York to expand its program beyond the Bronx courts, over which 
Justice McKeon presided, to courts in Brooklyn and Manhattan.58  
Additionally, the New York program now handles cases against both city 
and private hospitals.59 
This program is aimed at cutting $1.4 billion that is spent annually on 
medical malpractice premiums in New York.60  In addition to these 
exorbitant expenses, New York health care providers’ malpractice insurance 
rates are among the highest in the country.61  Furthermore, obstetrical and 
surgical premiums in New York have increased.62  Even with these startling 
statistics, the New York judge-directed negotiation program looks promising 
 
not settle early and lead to lawsuits.  New York State to Conduct Medical Liability Reform 
Demonstration, supra note 39. 
 56. Michelle Andrews, Judge Devises Model for Resolving Medical Malpractice Cases More 
Quickly, WASH. POST, Nov. 21, 2011, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-
science/judge-devises-model-for-resolving-medical-malpractice-cases-more-
quickly/2011/11/16/gIQAT0EthN_story.html; Hafemeister & Porter, supra note 15, at 741 (citing 
MEDICAL LIABILITY REFORM AND PATIENT SAFETY INITIATIVE PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 25).  
Under the direction of the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the U.S. Department of Health 
and Human Services’s Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality administered grants to Texas, 
Illinois, Michigan, and New York.  Health Care Appropriation Provides a Court-Based ADR Pilot 
Program, supra note 33, at 108.  Under another separate grant, five judges in Buffalo, New York, 
started a similar program in November 2011.  Gallegos, supra note 31. 
 57. Suzanne Sataline, Mediating Malpractice, WALL ST. J., July 23, 2010, at A1, available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703467304575383501123709186.html.  Harvard 
University’s School of Public Health has received a substantial part of the grant for evaluating and 
reporting the results after the three-year trial period.  Health Care Appropriation Provides a Court-
Based ADR Pilot Program, supra note 33, at 108. 
 58. William Glaberson, To Curb Malpractice Costs, Judges Jump in Early, N.Y. TIMES, June 
12, 2011, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/13/nyregion/to-curb-malpractice-costs-
judges-jump-in-early.html?pagewanted=all. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Sataline, supra note 57. 
 61. Just What the Doctor Ordered?, supra note 31. 
 62. See Sataline, supra note 57.  For example, in Brooklyn’s Maimonides Medical Center, 
obstetrical premiums increased from $13.5 million in 2007 to $17 million in 2008.  Id.  Pam Brief, 
the CEO and president of Maimonides Medical Center in Brooklyn, said that her staff has been 
searching for a long time for a way to cut insurance premiums, especially those for childbirth.  Id.  
One technique they have tried is to require that any member who has contact with an OB patient 
knows how to read a fetal monitor.  Id. 
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in improving New York’s malpractice liability because of its 95% settlement 
rate.63  With this success rate, HHC’s malpractice costs decreased from $196 
million in 2003 to $130 million in 2010,64 and the hospital’s average 
payment in medical malpractice cases declined from $567,000 in 2003 to 
$428,000 in 2010 as a result of measures to reduce liability costs, including 
settling cases before they reach trial.65  The Federal Agency for Healthcare 
Research and Quality, which funds the New York judge-directed negotiation 
program, estimates that the program could save more than $1 billion 
annually throughout the nation.66 
III. THE SUCCESS OF JUDGE-DIRECTED NEGOTIATIONS 
The decreased malpractice costs and the increased settlement rates 
resulting from the judge-directed negotiation program give rise to the 
question of why is the program so successful.  To adequately answer this 
question, we will look at the program’s two components: judges and 
negotiations. 
A. Putting the “Judge” in Judge-Directed Negotiations 
Judges are essential to the success of the New York judge-directed 
negotiation program.67  In comparison to programs in other states that were 
given grants,68 New York is the only state with a court component.69  Under 
the New York program, medical malpractice cases against any of the five 
participating hospitals are automatically given to judges in the judge-
directed negotiation program.70  These judges attempt to bring the parties 
together to discuss and address the situation.71  Then, the judges can advise 
the parties accordingly such that they come to a settlement.72 
 
 63. Just What the Doctor Ordered?, supra note 31.  According to New York State Court 
officials, statistics indicate Justice McKeon settles about 20% more cases than other judges.  
Glaberson, supra note 58. 
 64. Health Care Appropriation Provides a Court-Based ADR Pilot Program, supra note 33, at 
108 (quoting Sataline, supra note 56: “The [judge-directed negotiations] effort has cut payouts to 
$130 million this year, from a high of $196 million in 2003.”). 
 65. Glaberson, supra note 58. 
 66. Just What the Doctor Ordered?, supra note 31. 
 67. See Health Care Appropriation Provides A Court-Based ADR Pilot Program, supra note 
33, at 108. 
 68. These states include Texas, Illinois, and Michigan.  Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. See Hafemeister & Porter, supra note 15, at 747 (citing Scott, supra note 1). 
 72. See id. 
8
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Medical malpractice litigation can go on for many years with minimal 
judge involvement, and this lack of involvement increases legal expenses 
and solidifies the parties’ positions.73  These factors make it difficult for a 
judge in a non-judge-directed negotiation to control medical malpractice 
lawsuits.74  Without this control, lawsuits can come back several times to be 
heard before different judges.75  Settlement also becomes more difficult the 
longer a case lingers.76  However, in a judge-directed negotiation, a judge 
intervenes early on in the case and this can increase the chance of 
settlement.77 
Coming to a settlement agreement, of course, depends in part on the 
judge who conducts the negotiations.78  Justice McKeon acknowledges that 
certain judges would not be right for the role because of their lack of 
communication skills.79  Accordingly, judges in the program should be 
knowledgeable in medicine80 and communication81 because of the number of 
complexities in the health care field.   
The most obvious complexity is the amount of medical knowledge 
necessary to understand the health care field.82  Additionally, as part of the 
grant, each court will have the aid of a registered nurse with legal training 
who can confer with judges on claims and provide any necessary medical 
 
 73. Glaberson, supra note 58. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Michael Virtanen, More NY Courts to Focus on Medical Malpractice, WALL ST. J., Nov. 
11, 2011, available at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/nov/11/more-ny-courts-focus-
medical-malpractice/?page=all (quoting Justice McKeon: “Without close scrutiny by one judge, 
cases can come back several times before various judges with settlements discussed but doctors 
refusing to agree.”). 
 76. Glaberson, supra note 58. 
 77. See Just What the Doctor Ordered?, supra note 31. 
 78. Gallegos, supra note 32 (quoting Ronald Landau, a New York plaintiffs’ lawyer who had 
four medical liability cases go through the program: “If you can find a judge who can understand the 
perspective of the plaintiff and understand the constraints and the perspective of the defendant, it’s a 
terrific plan . . . .  I have had multiple mediation experiences over the years, and I would say 85% 
don’t work because the mediator just doesn’t have the right temperament.”). 
 79. See Telephone Interview with Judge Douglas McKeon, Bronx County Supreme Court 
(Feb. 23, 2012) [hereinafter Telephone Interview with Judge Douglas McKeon]. 
 80. See Scott, supra note 1 (noting that “having medically sophisticated justices is crucial.”). 
 81. Id.  For example, a “Medicine for Judges” course was designed to teach 100 justices about 
medicine and “humanness,” Justice McKeon’s term for “becoming a compassionate, sympathetic 
listener.”  Id. 
 82. See id. (quoting Justice McKeon who “always felt [he] needed basic knowledge of the 
medical lingo to effectively preside over a trial.”). 
9
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background.83  Moreover, Justice McKeon is using part of the grant to 
design medical curriculum for judges so that they can gain knowledge in 
medicine.84 
Another complexity is the number of different parties involved in the 
health care field’s decision-making system.85  For example, the party who 
purchases the service might not necessarily be the party who receives the 
service.86  Other complexities include the emotion and passion in the health 
care field due to the fact that people’s lives are at stake.87  Because of these 
complexities, judges under the judge-directed negotiation program need to 
have special training in medical-related lawsuits so that they are better able 
to evaluate the merits of a medical malpractice case.88 
B. Negotiating in Judge-Directed Negotiations 
Like judges, negotiations are another important aspect of the judge-
directed negotiation program.89  Negotiations can be defined as a process in 
which parties exchange information, generate decisions, and then implement 
what was decided.90  Justice McKeon has found that parties are willing to 
come in and talk if there is the potential to settle a case sooner rather than 
later for a significant amount of money.91  These negotiations are more than 
just the typical discussions of how much the parties want and are willing to 
spend; rather, the parties also discuss the strengths and weaknesses of their 
 
 83. Gallegos, supra note 32. 
 84. Scott, supra note 1. 
 85. Leonard J. Marcus, A Culture of Conflict: Lesson from Renegotiating Health Care, 5 J. 
HEALTH CARE LAW & POL’Y 447, 457 (2002). 
 86. Id.  Similarly, a physician who orders a health care service does not necessarily pay the 
financial consequences of that order.  Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Hafemeister & Porter, supra note 15, at 747.  See Gallegos, supra note 31 (discussing a 
plaintiffs’ lawyer who believed that through a judge-directed negotiation, he would be able to get at 
the complexities of the case with a judge who understood medical issues). 
 89. See Andrews, supra note 56. 
 90. Marcus, supra note 85, at 458.  In an interest-based negotiation, parties address their 
mutual and different interests.  Id. at 464.  Interests include goals, objectives, ideas, concerns, and 
hopes that the parties want to be satisfied through the negotiation.  Id.  In positional negotiations, one 
party’s objectives are best satisfied through victory, control, or dominance.  Id.  Therefore, positional 
negotiations usually establish winners and losers.  Id.  However, it is natural to negotiate based on 
self-interests because these interests define what the parties want to accomplish.  Id. (citing Leonard 
J. Marcus & Barry C. Dorn, Negotiating Organizational Alliances: The Walk in the Woods, AM. 
MED. NEWS, Sept. 21, 1998, at 19, available at http://business.highbeam.com/137033/article-1G1-
21168914/negotiating-organizational-alliances-walk-woods). 
 91. Andrews, supra note 56. 
10
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respective claims.92  The discussions lead to more discussions, with each 
case having about three to four negotiation meetings.93  The negotiation may 
reach a point where the attorneys leave the meeting but continue their 
discussions over the phone.94  It is thus this “[negotiation] environment that 
fosters discussion, and discussion fosters resolution.”95 
The negotiation and judge component of the judge-directed negotiation 
program help contribute to the success of the program. 
IV. PRAISES FOR THE JUDGE-DIRECTED NEGOTIATION PROGRAM 
Due to the success of judge-directed negotiations, there are many praises 
for the program.  The praises regard the amount of time and money saved to 
settle a case, and the forum the program provides for both parties to be 
heard. 
A. Giving the Gift of Efficiency 
One of the benefits of the judge-directed negotiation program is that it 
saves time and money because it bypasses years of court battles.96  Judge-
directed negotiations have cut the HHC’s case backlog by 33%, and the 
average time it takes to resolve a case has fallen by 17% in the past three 
years.97  This success may be seen as a result of the judge’s involvement in a 
judge-directed negotiation.98  From the very beginning of a judge-directed 
negotiation, the judge “can delve into a case with an eye towards 
settlement.”99  The judge then holds frequent negotiation meetings in the 
beginning stages of a case, which can lead to an early settlement.100 
This timeline is very different from what typically happens now, given 
that the pre-trial phase—in which depositions are taken and other evidence is 
 
       92. Gallegos, supra note 32. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. See Telephone Interview with Justice Douglas McKeon, supra note 79. 
 96. Glaberson, supra note 58. 
 97. Scott, supra note 1. 
 98. See Andrews, supra note 56. 
 99. Id. (quoting Justice McKeon: “From the beginning, that designated jurist can delve into the 
case with an eye toward settlement.”). 
 100. See Glaberson, supra note 58. 
11
Gamboa: Positive Prognosis for Judges: A Look into Judge-Directed Negotia
Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2013
 246 
gathered—can drag on for months or even years.101  During this pre-trial 
phase, a number of judges may be involved, and no one judge may push the 
parties toward resolution.102  Usually settlement conferences are held years 
after a case is filed, and it might be seen as merely a “pro forma exercise”103 
that is held simply as a formality because it might be too late in the lawsuit 
for the parties to settle complicated issues.104 
However, negotiation meetings in a judge-directed negotiation occur 
after only several months.105  These settlement conferences can better help 
parties settle their case,106 which is particularly important because medical 
malpractice cases take longer than other kinds of tort cases.107  If the parties 
do settle, compensation to injured parties can be paid out years earlier than a 
jury award and without lengthy appeals.108 
Judge-directed negotiations are also helpful in finding and excluding 
doctors who have no responsibility early on in a case.109  Plaintiff attorneys 
initially often include a long list of alleged defendants in the claim such that 
they do not lose the chance of adding defendants later.110  This strategy can 
cause doctors who are not at fault to spend years defending a claim before 
 
 101. Andrews, supra note 56.  According to Michelle M. Mello, a Harvard professor of law and 
public health who is evaluating the New York experiment, a typical medical malpractice case can 
take three years from the date the claim is filed to the date the case is closed.  Id.  A typical time 
frame for settling one of Justice McKeon’s cases is six to nine months.  Id. 
 102. Id.  In a traditional medical malpractice claim, up to four different judges may oversee one 
medical liability case at different intervals.  Gallegos, supra note 31. 
 103. Glaberson, supra note 58. 
 104. Id. (quoting Michelle M. Mello: “Ordinarily when the parties come to a settlement 
conference, it’s late in the game . . . .  It’s often a pro forma exercise rather than an attempt to 
grapple with the tricky issues in the case.”).  Under New York’s Civil Practice Law Rule 3409, a 
court involved in a medical malpractice action shall hold a mandatory settlement conference 45 days 
after the filing of the note of issue and certificate of readiness or within 45 days after the denial of 
such motion.  NY CPLR Rule 3409. 
 105. Health Care Appropriation Provides a Court-Based ADR Pilot Program, supra note 33, at 
108.  There is a strong policy in favor of allowing a judge’s inherent authority to preserve efficiency 
and the judicial process through settlement conferences.  See 6A Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 1525.1 
(3d ed.). 
 106. Glaberson, supra note 58. 
 107. David A. Hyman & Charles Silver, Medical Malpractice Litigation and Tort Reform: It’s 
the Incentives, Stupid, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1085, 1106 (2006).  Michael Heise, a professor who 
studied a nationwide sample of tried cases, found that the average length for civil cases that reached 
juries was 30.2 months whereas the average length of tried malpractice cases lasted 38.4 months or 
more than half a year longer.  Id. (citing Michael Heise, Justice Delayed? An Empirical Analysis of 
Civil Case Disposition Time, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 813, 834 (2000)). 
 108. Glaberson, supra note 58. 
 109. Gallegos, supra note 32. 
 110. Id. 
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being dismissed from the case.111  Doctors initially named in a traditional 
medical malpractice claim generally are not dismissed from the lawsuit until 
after the discovery process, which can be up to fifteen months after a claim 
has been filed.112  However, in judge-directed negotiations, doctors who are 
not at fault typically are dismissed within the first six months.113 
Not only can doctors be dismissed from the claim, but also the entire 
claim can be dismissed.114  During the judge’s meeting with the parties in a 
judge-directed negotiation, the judge can advise each party as to what it can 
reasonably expect from a jury trial.115  In one case, Justice McKeon warned 
lawyers representing a hospital that jurors most likely would not be 
influenced by their claim that a patient who died was somewhat responsible 
for his death because he ignored his doctors.116  A judge’s intervention will 
help a party evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of its case, which might 
help a party to recognize its “unrealistic expectations about winning big in 
court”117 or deter a party from pursuing a weak case.118 
Thus, quick resolution of medical malpractice cases benefits all parties: 
the court system gets to put its limited resources elsewhere, health care 
providers can put the situation behind them, and hospitals can gain 
information to help improve patient safety efforts.119 
B. Giving Parties a Voice 
Another praise for judge-directed negotiations is that both parties to be 
heard during the negotiation meetings.120  Being given a voice may be as 
important to a party as its financial concerns.121  Communicating with the 
other party also allows parties to learn more about the situation and better 
understand it.122  A Harvard School of Public Health’s Care Negotiation 
 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Glaberson, supra note 58. 
 117. Just What the Doctor Ordered?, supra note 31. 
 118. Glaberson, supra note 58. 
 119. Andrews, supra note 56. 
 120. Just What the Doctor Ordered?, supra note 31. 
 121. Id. 
 122. See Just What the Doctor Ordered?, supra note 31. 
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training seminar demonstrated that once there is an error, problem, or 
miscommunication while a patient is under the care of the hospital, patients 
and family members primarily seek to know what happened.123  However, 
our standard adversarial system has been seen as discouraging such 
discussion.124  Judge-directed negotiations provide parties with a forum to 
discuss and gain a better understanding of the situation.125  Moreover, 
lawyers representing either party also feel that their voices are heard in an 
appropriate forum given that judges in the judge-directed negotiation 
program have medical knowledge, and thus, understand the situation better 
than the average judge.126  In this way, judge-directed negotiations can be 
seen as providing a more holistic way of approaching medical malpractice 
cases.127 
V. CRITICISMS OF JUDGE-DIRECTED NEGOTIATIONS 
Although there are many praises for judge-directed negotiations, there 
are still criticisms.  These criticisms question a judge’s involvement in the 
negotiations, the fairness of the settlements, and whether the program 
actually solves medical malpractice problems. 
A. Too Much Judge in Judge-Directed Negotiations? 
A major criticism against judge-directed negotiations is the judge’s 
involvement in the negotiation.128  As previously stated, judges in judge-
directed negotiations intervene early in a case and guide the parties toward a 
settlement.129  During these negotiations, a judge’s neutrality might be 
 
 123. Marcus, supra note 85, at 454. 
 124. Id. 
 125. See id. at 454.  There are alternatives to the legal system: patients may change providers, 
complain to their providers, or report their providers’ inadequacies to regulators and disciplinary 
authorities.  Hyman & Silver, supra note 12, at 1115 (citing Marlynn L. May & Daniel B. Stengel, 
Who Sues Their Doctors? How Patients Handle Medical Grievances, 24 LAW & SOC’Y. REV. 105, 
108 (1990)).  These alternatives are cheaper than a lawsuit and may be more efficient.  Id.  However, 
some of those people who sue also take advantage of these alternatives as well.  See May & Stengel, 
supra note 76, at 108 (finding that 85% of those who sued switched doctors and 31% complained). 
 126. Scott, supra note 1 (quoting Barry Washor, a Manhattan medical malpractice lawyer: 
“Under the current system, you can end up with any Supreme Court Justice . . . .  Some of them 
don’t have a clue.  They don’t understand the case, and they don’t understand the law.”). 
 127. Health Care Appropriation Provides A Court-Based ADR Pilot Program, supra note 33, at 
108. 
 128. See Just What the Doctor Ordered?, supra note 31 (noting that the “process also invites 
criticism by borrowing some elements of mediation and neglecting others.”). 
 129. MEDICAL LIABILITY REFORM AND PATIENT SAFETY INITIATIVE PROGRESS REPORT, supra 
note 25. 
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questioned because a judge might unknowingly bring some degree of bias 
toward a party or lawsuit, particularly if that judge is involved in both the 
negotiation meetings and subsequent adjudication.130  In addition, a judge’s 
neutrality might be questioned in a judge-directed negotiation because a 
judge is allowed to express his or her opinion about a party’s offer. 131  
Neutrality is an important element of any mediator,132 who is typically not 
allowed to express his or her opinion about a party’s offer, 133 and some 
argue that it is compromised in judge-directed negotiations.134  However, 
this argument assumes that judge-directed negotiations are considered 
mediations, which is not how participants in judge-directed negotiations 
categorize them.135  Rather, participants distinguish judge-directed 
negotiations as a mediation technique.136 
Regardless of whether or not judge-directed negotiations are a mediation 
technique or type of mediation, some observers are still wary of a judge’s 
involvement in that they characterize it as intimidation.137  An injured party, 
who views the judge as an authoritative figure, might be intimidated by the 
judge’s involvement.138  Because of this intimidation, the injured party might 
accept an offer that is not fair.139  However, injured parties might actually 
 
 130. See Just What the Doctor Ordered?, supra note 31. 
 131. Just What the Doctor Ordered?, supra note 31.  For example, Justice McKeon warned 
hospital lawyers that jurors most likely would not be influenced by their claim that a patient who 
died was somewhat responsible for his death because he ignored his doctors.  Glaberson, supra note 
58. 
 132. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 1115 (West 2006) (defining “mediator” as “a neutral person 
who conducts a mediation.)  “Mediator” includes any person designated by a mediator either to 
assist in the mediation or to communicate with the participants in preparation for a mediation, a 
neutral person who conducts a mediation.  Id. 
 133. Just What the Doctor Ordered?, supra note 31. 
 134. Id. 
 135. See Health Care Appropriation Provides A Court-Based ADR Pilot Program, supra note 
33, at 108. 
 136. Id. (quoting Judge Judy Harris Kluger, chief of policy and planning for New York State’s 
Unified Court System: “It’s not ADR-type mediation . . . it’s really a judge sitting down and trying 
to settle a case early on, earlier than they would other cases.  It’s a mediation technique.”); see also 
Telephone Interview with Judge Douglas McKeon, supra note 79. 
 137. See Just What the Doctor Ordered?, supra note 31. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id.; see also Glaberson, supra note 58 (quoting Louis G. Solimano, a plaintiffs’ lawyer 
who seemed disappointed that “[he] didn’t get a grand slam” and Nicholas I. Timko, the president of 
the New York State Trial Lawyers Association, who believes “[t]here’s pressure to take less than 
might be fair compensation.”); Virtanen, supra note 75 (quoting Arthur Levin, director of the Center 
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benefit from a judge’s involvement, particularly if the judge has many years 
of malpractice experience and can advise the parties accordingly.140 
B. Fair Settlements in Judge-Directed Negotiations? 
In addition to a judge’s involvement in a judge-directed negotiation, 
another criticism is that the process is unfair to the injured parties.141  
Because judge-directed negotiations occur in a judge’s chambers, some fear 
that injured parties will be “shut out” of the courtroom and their day in 
court.142  Although generally the lawyers are the only people present during 
the negotiations,143 judges might allow the injured parties to attend.144  
Nonetheless, others are still afraid that judge-directed negotiations might 
allow lawyers to negotiate in private over the price of a party’s injury.145  
However, regardless of whether or not a case is part of the judge-directed 
negotiation program, lawyers still negotiate in private and must participate in 
mandatory settlement conferences.146 
Others feel that judge-directed negotiations are unfair to the injured 
parties because injured parties frequently receive less than they would from 
a jury award.147  However, Justice McKeon argues that injured parties 
probably want fair compensation received in a timelier manner rather than a 
jury award that takes several years.148  Even if an injured party receives 
compensation, others argue that the injured parties are still vulnerable to 
exploitation because they receive offers early on in a case, while still 
working through the trauma of the injury or loss of a loved one and before 
 
for Medical Consumer: “Even though people are not forced into [negotiated settlements], I have no 
idea how coercive or not the pitch is.”). 
 140. See Glaberson, supra note 58 (quoting Ronald J. Landau, a plaintiffs’ lawyer, who stated 
that “[w]hen [Justice McKeon] gives an opinion to me about how he thinks a jury’s going to respond 
to a case, he’s generally on target.”). 
 141. See Just What the Doctor Ordered?, supra note 31. 
 142. Id.  In contrast, some lawyers actually like not having the injured parties in the courtroom 
because they are more relaxed without patients and doctors watching.  See Glaberson, supra note 58. 
 143. See Glaberson, supra note 58.  Lawyers have the authority to settle, and thus, injured 
parties are not required to attend the judge-directed negotiation.  Id. 
 144. See Telephone Interview with Judge Douglas McKeon, supra note 79. 
 145. Just What the Doctor Ordered?, supra note 31. 
 146. See Glaberson, supra note 58; see also supra note 104 and accompanying text (discussing 
mandatory settlement conferences). 
 147. Gallegos, supra note 32. 
 148. Gallegos, supra note 32; see also Andrews, supra note 58 (quoting Leslie Kelmatcher, 
president of the New York State Trial Lawyers Association: “Many families would rather have 5 
percent less now than a [larger amount] three years down the road.  Prompt resolution allows them to 
get financial compensation and some degree of closure, so they can move on with their lives.”). 
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they know the extent of their future expenses.149  Some proposals may even 
be extremely punitive toward patients who do not accept the settlement offer 
provided by the hospital.150  However, a judge’s role in a judge-directed 
negotiation is to guide the parties toward a fair settlement, and thus, the 
judge can prevent a party from using such bullying tactics.151 
C. Problem Solved with Judge-Directed Negotiations? 
Another criticism is that judge-directed negotiations only address the 
surface of the medical malpractice system, rather than delving into the root 
of the problem by improving hospitals and patient safety.152  In fact, the 
RAND Institute for Civil Justice’s recently studied California malpractice 
claims and concluded that improved safety performance is an important 
“focal point” in addressing the medical malpractice debate.153  However, the 
expanded judge-directed negotiation program does focus on improving 
patient safety and reducing malpractice costs.154  This focus differs from 
traditional tort reforms, which “were adopted to ensure access to liability 
insurance for providers and to protect them from the volatility of the medical 
liability insurance market.”155 
In order to enhance patient safety, an effective system should require 
providers to “candidly acknowledge their errors and learn from their 
mistakes.”156  The judge-directed negotiation program does include this 
 
 149. Amy Widman, Liability and the Health Care Bill: An “Alternative” Perspective, 1 CAL. L. 
REV. CIRCUIT 57, 64 (2010). 
 150. Id.  For example, some proposals penalize patients who reject an offer with fees or require 
a higher burden of proof to patients who sue.  Id. (citing Bernard Black, David A. Hyman & Charles 
Silver, The Effects of “Early Offers” in Medical Malpractice Cases: Evidence from Texas, 6 J. OF 
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDIES 723, 727 (2009)). 
 151. See Just What the Doctor Ordered?, supra note 31. 
 152. Health Care Appropriation Provides A Court-Based ADR Pilot Program, supra note 33, at 
108. 
 153. Widman, supra note 149, at 60 (citing MICHAEL D. GREENBERG ET AL., IS BETTER 
PATIENT SAFETY ASSOCIATED WITH LESS MALPRACTICE ACTIVITY? EVIDENCE FROM CALIFORNIA 
(2010), available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/2010/RAND_TR824.pdf). 
 154. Just What the Doctor Ordered?, supra note 31. 
 155. Leonard J. Nelson, III, David J. Becker & Michael A. Morrisey, Medical Liability and 
Health Care Reform, 21 HEALTH MATRIX 443, 496 (2011). 
 156. Id. (citing JOINT COMM’N ON ACCREDITATION OF HEALTH CARE ORGS., HEALTHCARE AT 
THE CROSSROADS: STRATEGIES FOR IMPROVING THE MEDICAL LIABILITY SYSTEM AND PATIENT 
SAFETY (2005), available at http:// www.jointcommission.org/assets/1/18/Medical_Liability.pdf 
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requirement because it is part of a bigger project that consists of four major 
components, three of which are specifically aimed at improving patient 
safety.157  One of these components, the hospital component, entails that 
each hospital implement a program that will provide early disclosure to a 
patient and, if the patient desires, to his or her family when a medical error 
occurs.158  Furthermore, as part of the New York program’s full-disclosure 
policy, hospitals have agreed to own up to their mistakes and apologize.159  
This early disclosure program will allow providers to candidly acknowledge 
their errors and learn from their mistakes, which will help enhance patient 
safety.160 
Although the judge-directed negotiation component does not 
specifically state that it will improve patient safety, it does state that the 
 
[hereinafter HEALTHCARE AT THE CROSSROADS]; Lawrence Gostin, A Public Health Approach to 
Reducing Error, 283 JAMA 1742, 1742 (2000)). 
 157. See New York State to Conduct Medical Liability Reform Demonstration, supra note 40. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Scott, supra note 1.  This full-disclosure policy is known as “Sorry Works”.  Id.; see DOUG 
WOJCIESZAK, ET AL., SORRY WORKS!  DISCLOSURE, APOLOGY, AND RELATIONSHIPS PREVENT 
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS (Authorhouse 2007); SORRY WORKS!, http://www.sorryworks.net/ 
(last updated Dec. 12, 2012). 
  Apologies and disclosure in the medical context are beyond the scope of this article.  
However, for more information see Flauren F. Bender, “I’m Sorry” Laws and Medical Liability, 9 
VIRTUAL MENTOR: AM. MED. ASS’N J. ETHICS 300 (2007); Jonathan R. Cohen, Apology and 
Organizations: Exploring an Example from Medical Practice, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1447 (2000); 
Ashley A. Davenport, Forgive and Forget: Recognition of Error and Use of Apology as Preemptive 
Steps to ADR or Litigation in Medical Malpractice Cases, 6 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 81 (2006); 
Thomas H. Gallagher et al., Patients’ and Physicians’ Attitudes Regarding the Disclosure of Medical 
Errors, 289 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1001 (2003); Rae M. Lamb, Open Disclosure: The Only Approach 
to Medical Error, 13 QUALITY & SAFETY IN HEALTH CARE 3 (2004), available at http://www.
ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1758054/pdf/v013p00003.pdf; Mazor et al., Disclosure of 
Medical Errors: What Factors Influence How Patients Respond?, 21 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 704 
(2006); Mazor et al., Health Plan Members’ Views about Disclosure of Medical Errors, 140 
ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 409 (2004); Robbennolt, Apologies and Medical Error, 467 CLIN. 
ORTHOP. RELAT. RES. 376 (2009); Jennifer K. Robbennolt, What We Know and Don’t About the 
Role of Apologies in Resolving Health Care Disputes, 21 GA. ST. L. REV. 1009 (2005); Lee Taft, 
Apology and Medical Mistake: Opportunity or Foil?, 14 ANN. HEALTH L. 55 (2005); Peter Geier, 
Emerging Med-Mal Strategy: “I’m Sorry,” NAT’L L. J., Jul. 24, 2006, available at http://www.law.
com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1153472732197; Laura Landro, The Informed Patient: Doctors Learn to Say 
“I’m Sorry”: Patients’ Stories of Hospital Errors Serve to Teach Staff, WALL ST. J., Jan. 24, 2007, 
at D5, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB116960074741385710.html; Kevin Sack, Doctors 
Say “I’m Sorry” Before “See You in Court,” N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2008, at A1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/18/us/18apology.html?pagewanted=all; Charlie Schmidt, “We’re 
Sorry”: The Healing Power of Apology—And How Two Little Words Can Make Medicine Safer, 
HARV. PUB. HEALTH REV., Fall 2007, at 8; Gail Garfinkel Weiss, Should You Apologize?, MEDICAL 
ECONOMICS, Apr. 21, 2006, at 50, available at http://medicaleconomics.modernmedicine.com/
memag/content/printContentPopup.jsp?id=319420. 
 160. Nelson, III, et al. supra note 154, at 496 (citing HEALTHCARE AT THE CROSSROADS, supra 
note 155; Gostin, supra note 155, at 1742). 
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judge-directed negotiation program will be established to achieve early 
settlement.161  Early settlement will be achieved through disclosure, 
communication, and a judge’s involvement earlier on in a case.162  Through 
early settlement, health care providers will be able to receive feedback from 
judges early on in a lawsuit.163  From this feedback, health care providers 
can make necessary changes, which can ultimately improve patient safety.164 
VI. THE VERDICT IS IN FOR JUDGE-DIRECTED NEGOTIATIONS 
Despite the criticisms against judge-directed negotiations, judge-
directed negotiations appear to provide a promising method for addressing 
medical-malpractice litigation and could “serve as a model for other types of 
tort cases as well.”165  The Obama administration certainly recognizes the 
positive impact judge-directed negotiations has had on our nation’s health 
care system given that it praises judge-directed negotiations for offering a 
way for states “to curb liability expenses that have sharply increased health 
care costs nationally.”166  Although there is no data for the expanded judge-
directed negotiation program because at the time this article was written, the 
three-year Harvard study was still being conducted,167 the numbers regarding 
New York’s program show promising results.168  In fact, the federal Agency 
for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ), which funds the New York 
judge-directed negotiation program, estimates that the program could save 
more than $1 billion annually throughout the nation.169  Moreover, Dr. James 
B. Battles, the official overseeing the grant at the AHRQ, “hope[s] that other 
states across the country [will] look at [the New York program] as a model 
they might want to replicate.”170  Granted, each state has different medical 
malpractice insurance systems and tort reform, and New York’s success 
 
 161. See New York State to Conduct Medical Liability Reform Demonstration, supra note 40. 
 162. Scott, supra note 1 (quoting HHC President Al Aviles: “If you are very transparent and 
skilled in communication, you lower the sense of rage . . . and make settling cases easier.”). 
 163. See New York State to Conduct Medical Liability Reform Demonstration, supra note 40. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Just What the Doctor Ordered?, supra note 31. 
 166. Glaberson, supra note 58. 
 167. Health Care Appropriation Provides A Court-Based ADR Pilot Program, supra note 33, at 
108. 
 168. See Sataline, supra note 57 
 169. Just What the Doctor Ordered?, supra note 31. 
 170. Glaberson, supra note 58. 
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might not directly translate to other states.  However, if a state like New 
York, whose health care providers have among the highest malpractice 
insurance rates in the country,171 can have such positive results, it seems that 
judge-directed negotiations can become a national model for other states to 
follow.172  Moreover, the judge-directed negotiation program works within 
our current court systems such that laws do not need to be changed if states 
adopt a judge-directed negotiation program.173 
The problem, however, arises with funding.174  States that adopt a judge-
directed negotiation program will have to find the finances to train judges 
and hire medical assistants to help the judge.175  However, in the long run, 
judge-directed negotiations save money by settling a case after only several 
months rather than after several years.176  Moreover, not all areas of a state 
may need to find funding to support a judge-directed negotiation program 
because certain areas of a state may not have the same problem with 
malpractice costs.177  For example, judge-directed negotiations might work 
better in an urban setting that gives rise to high malpractice rates rather than 
a rural area in which local hospitals have low malpractice rates.178  
Furthermore, even if every state adopted a judge-directed negotiation 
program, this will not solve all the problems that arise from medical 
malpractice litigation.179  Rather, judge-directed negotiations can be one of 
 
 171. Just What the Doctor Ordered?, supra note 31. 
 172. See Gallegos, supra note 32. 
 173. Id. (quoting James Battles, PhD, a senior service fellow for patient safety and medical 
errors at the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality: “There are no laws that need to be 
changed.  All the mechanics are in place.”).  In contrast, health courts, in which specialized judges 
review and rule on medical liability cases, require changing existing laws.  Id. 
 174. See Gallegos, supra note 32. 
 175. Id. (quoting Michelle Mello: “Other states would need money to train judges and hire a 
medical assistant, such as the nurse/attorney being used by New York judges.  Another challenge 
would be to find the right team and funding to evaluate their program.”). 
 176. See Health Care Appropriation Provides A Court-Based ADR Pilot Program, supra note 
33, at 108. 
 177. See Virtanen, supra note 75 (quoting New York Chief Administrative Judge Ann Pfau: “It 
makes sense for the pilot program to target high-population areas with a large number of cases and 
high hospital malpractice costs,” and Justice McKeon: “What you’re finding is in poorer 
communities you’re getting higher incidence of this and in poorer communities you’re finding the 
huge verdicts.”). 
 178. See Telephone Interview with Judge Douglas McKeon, supra note 79. 
 179. Gallegos, supra note 32 (quoting Morris M. Auster, staff counsel for the Medical Society 
of the State of New York: “We’re very hopeful that if this is very successful in reducing liability 
costs, it could be expanded further . . . .  but it’s not the be-all, end-all to address medical malpractice 
insurance [rates].”).  For example, New York physicians will not get significant relief from 
insurance premiums and claims severity until the state enacts a noneconomic damages cap.  Id. 
(quoting Donald J. Fager, vice president of Medical Liability Mutual Insurance Company, the largest 
writer of medical liability insurance in New York). 
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many possible solutions.180  Although a judge-directed negotiation program 
may not be adopted by all other states, it certainly has opened up the 




 180. Gallegos, supra note 32 (quoting Morris M. Auster: “[Judge-directed negotiations are] one 
of a series of solutions.”). 
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